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The EU-enlargement and the advanced process of economic integration have 
brought attention to monetary integration and the conditions for its successful 
functioning. The main theoretical framework of the analysis – the OCA-theory – 
foresees three main requirements for that – mobility of production factors, fiscal 
solidarity and trade integration. Although not theoretically founded, the 
Maastricht criteria of price and exchange rate stability, balanced public finance 
and long-term interest rates should contribute to successful monetary integration 
in the EU which faces inter-regional differences in the level of development and 
the possibility of external shocks. The analysis of nominal convergence shows 
that Croatia approaches the reference values of the EU and achieves a high 
degree of macroeconomic stability. However, it lags behind the successful new 
EU-member states in respect of trade integration and production structure 
similarity which can be regarded as important indicators of the long-term 
advantages of monetary integration.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Dynamics and intensity of economic integration have brought attention 
to monetary integration1 and the theoretical assumptions for its successful 
functioning. The central issue in this respect is the choice between fixed and 
floating exchange rate referring further to the economic policy priorities – 
macroeconomic stability vs. economic growth, i.e. more restrictive or loose 
economic policy. The main advantage of floating exchange rate is its 
effectiveness in restoring economic balance in case of external shocks. On the 
other hand, such an adjustment would be more costly, not to say impossible, with 
fixed exchange rate since output and employment recovery would follow only 
after a certain period of time. However, unlike floating exchange rates, fixed 
parities make business conditions more predictable and imply less risk for doing 
business internationally. Assuming inter-regional differences in the level of 
development within monetary integration and with reference to the economic 
policy trade-off between inflation and unemployment the common monetary 
policy would not have the same effect across regions. More developed regions 
would need restrictive monetary policy in order to 'cool down' the negative effect 
of growing economy on prices, leading possibly to recession and increasing 
unemployment in the less developed regions. More loose monetary policy would, 
however help them to reduce the development gap towards the advanced regions 
through more dynamic economic growth. Thus, the balanced economic growth in 
monetary union depends upon readiness of the developed regions to accept a 
certain degree of price instability (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963). 
Regarding advanced relations of Croatia with the EU and the current 
accession negotiations the aim of the paper is to investigate Croatian readiness for 
monetary integration as one of the commitments of the full-fledged membership. 
Based on theoretical inferences about the possible impact of monetary integration 
on small open economies (SMOPEC) the analysis deals with both nominal and 
real criteria of convergence, thus referring to the conditions of macroeconomic 
stability and structural complementary among the integrating countries. The 
purpose is to shed light on those aspects of economic reforms and economic 
policy which would need improvements in order to make monetary integration 
more advantageous for Croatia. 
The first part of the paper refers to the relevant theoretical background 
which includes the optimum currency area theory and the ‘endogeneity approach’ 
to creation of a successful monetary union. This part also presents the main 
formal framework of monetary integration with the EU – the Maastricht criteria. 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. 
1 Currency areas are characterised by fixing exchange rate between different national currencies, while 
monetary unions include single currency. Real currency areas (e.g. bimetalism, the gold standard) 
incorporate automatic adjustments and convergence of interest rates supported by stabilizing market 
speculations. Pseudo currency areas (e.g. the Bretton-Woods system, European Monetary System – 
EMS) are based primarilly on economic policy interventions and realize no automatic stabilization 
(Mundell, 1997). 
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In the second part, Croatia is analysed according to the four nominal convergence 
criteria, while the notion of real convergence is introduced in the third part and 
followed by the analysis of Croatia. The final part concludes. 
 
 
1. CRITERIA FOR THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA 
CREATION 
1.1.  Traditional approach to optimum currency area 
Theory of optimum currency area (OCA) differentiates among three 
main criteria for successful monetary integration. The first one relates to the 
mobility of production factors and openness of factor markets which make free 
setting of prices possible, including flexible factor prices as a necessary condition 
for the efficient economic adjustment and realization of external balance. Under 
demand shock, resulting from demand shift from one region to another, mobile 
capital flows into the deficit region to restore domestic demand and external 
balance without need for exchange rate adjustment. The same effect can be 
realized through wage flexibility and labour migration from high- to low-
unemployment region in case of supply shock hitting one region by fall in 
economic activities (Temprano/Arroyo, 2003). In order to make these 
adjustments effective and avoid exchange rate policy interventions institutional 
conditions have to be created to make production factors mobile within the 
monetary union. As far as capital is concerned financial market openness would 
imply liberalization of cross-border capital flows for both current and capital 
account transactions, particularly regarding the long-term capital flows (e.g. FDI). 
Unlike strong tendencies of capital market liberalization, labour market is 
generally still far from being fully liberalized2.  
The next relevant criterion for the OCA-formation is the degree of trade 
integration among the prospective members of the monetary union. The readiness 
for monetary integration depends in first instance on the country's economic 
openness. The more open the economy, the more prepared for fixed exchange rate 
or common currency, since changes in nominal exchange rate in open economies 
have no significant influence on real competitiveness. This is particularly the case 
with SMOPEC which face perfectly elastic foreign demand and are therefore 
unable to influence world prices, not even through adjustments in the exchange 
rate. Trade interdependence is a prerequisite for successful monetary integration 
since countries which trade more would have more advantages from stabile and 
predictable exchange rates (Alesina/Barro, 2002). The advantages of trade 
integration are even greater if they realise similar trade and production structure. 
                                                 
2 Cross-border capital mobility depends on financial market efficiency, legal conditions for 
investment, macroeconomic stability and the overall prospects for economic growth. Although these 
factors also influence labour mobility in broad terms it is considered that differences in cultural 
affinities, language, income, social welfare system and the housing market determine labour force 
migrations more directly. 
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Therefore, with specialization according to comparative advantage, based either 
on production efficiency or factor proportions, the existing differences in export 
and import flows and terms of trade can increase the risk of asymmetric shocks in 
the monetary union3. However, this problem disappears if countries have similar 
structure of trade flows (intra-industry trade), reducing thus the possibilities for 
asymmetric shocks4. Furthermore, economies having a more diversified 
production structure better respond to external shocks (Tavlas, 1993). 
Finally, fiscal integration as a relevant instrument in creating an OCA, 
can help in eliminating asymmetric shocks through fiscal transfers from more 
developed regions to those which are hit by fall in economic activities.  
 
1.2. 'Endogeneity view' of the optimum currency area 
Previous analysis fails to observe the process of economic adjustment 
which follows after creation of a monetary union. According to the Lucas 
Critique, the 'endogeneity view' of the OCA-criteria points at dynamics of the 
adjustment process, referring to both economic policy measures and changes in 
economic structure of the integrating countries. Giving up monetary and 
exchange rate policy independence, calls for increasing wage and labour market 
flexibility and a functioning inter-regional fiscal transfer scheme5. Apart from 
that, many empirical studies (Frankel/Rose, 1997, 1998; Bayoumi/Eichengreen, 
1997; Fidrmuc, 2004) proved that economic adjustment helps in creating a 
functioning monetary integration. Thanks to these conclusions it can be claimed 
that even countries which do not comply with the standard OCA-criteria prior to 
monetary integration can become part of a successful monetary union. Monetary 
integration can significantly contribute to rise in trade flows through fixing 
exchange rates and elimination of their unpredictable fluctuations. The effect of 
trade on synchronization of business cycles depends on the degree of industrial 
specialization induced by integration, clearly indicating the endogeneity character 
of the causality. The resulting changes in economic structures as a part of broader 
economic adjustment process, determine industrial specialization which is 
reflected in trade pattern. As long as the participating countries realize 
specialization within, instead of between sectors, increasing trade flows are 
                                                 
3 Even highly integrated economies in terms of trade can experience asymmetric shocks as long as 
they fail to realise the same degree of similarity in the output structure (see: Temprano-Arroyo, 2003). 
4 On the importance of the structure of trade on the success of monetary integration, from the point of 
view of the endogeneous approach to relation between trade and business cycle, see: Fidrmuc, 2004. 
5 Optimum condition for a viable monetary union would be dynamic economic growth which 
eliminates the need for economic policy interventions (Mann-Quirici, 2005; Pomfret, 2005). However, 
historical analyses prove that, contrary to expectations, changes in industrial and employment 
structure as well as institutional conditions in the last half of century have not reduced wages 
sensitivity to the stage of business cycle (Allen, 1992). 
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dominated by intra-industry trade (IIT) what makes monetary union more 
homogeneous and thus more resistant to asymmetric shocks6.  
 
1.3. Nominal criteria for monetary integration – the Maastricht 
criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact of the European 
Monetary Union 
The process of monetary integration in the EU7 has foreseen the 
fulfilment of the nominal criteria prior to joining the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aimed 
primarily at achieving macroeconomic stability upon monetary integration. 
Despite some criticism that these are not theoretically founded (De Grauwe, 
1996) and are lacking the economic adjustment mechanism (Feldstein, 2005), 
they should be seen as criteria which give an impetus for monetary integration 
which is in the case of the EU not a spontaneous, but a politically driven process. 
The Maastricht criteria of macroeconomic convergence include: 
1. inflation – inflation rate (harmonised consumer price index) should 
not exceed that of the three best performing member countries of the 
EU by more than 1,5 percentage points; 
2. government finance –consolidated general government deficit 
should not exceed 3% of the GDP and the government debt to GDP 
ratio should not go beyond 60%, both at the end of the previous 
fiscal year; 
3. exchange rate – countries should participate in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II) under the European Monetary System 
(EMS) without devaluations of the domestic currencies for two 
consecutive years prior to joining the EMU; 
4. long-term interest rates – the nominal long-term interest rate 
(government bonds) should not be higher than that of the three best 
performing member countries (based on inflation) by more than 2 
percentage points. 
These criteria are primarily aimed at achieving low inflation and the 
control of the fiscal sector. This is strongly emphasised in the SGP which obliges 
the member countries to achieve a medium-to-long-term fiscal balance (de facto 
the second Maastricht criteria) and avoid negative effects of different national 
fiscal policies on the price stability. Further, balanced budget makes it possible 
for national policy makers to cope effectively with asymmetric shocks, 
                                                 
6 For empirical verification of the relevance of trade integration on the ex post effects of monetary 
integration see: Arnold/Verhoef, 2004; Boreiko, 2003 and Rose/Engel, 2002. For explanation of an 
alternative ex post-adjustment mechanism see: Corsetti/Penseti, 2002. 
7 The three stages included: full capital flow liberalization, institution building (European Monetary 
Institute, European Central Bank) and introduction of the single currency (2002). 
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particularly under de-centralized fiscal system and without inter-regional fiscal 
transfers8. The SGP consists of fiscal monitoring and sanctions against member 
states which do not fulfil the criteria. If the fiscal conditions of an individual 
country do not comply with the rules of the SGP this leads to a series of measures 
ranging from recommendations for strengthening of a stabilization programme to 
penalties in form of non-interest bearing deposits or fines (amounting to 0,2% of 
the national GDP plus one-tenth of the amount by which the actual budget deficit 
went beyond 3% of GDP). The measures undertaken depend upon the degree of 
the fiscal imbalance, its time persistency and the degree of economic slowdown 
(more in: Arestis et al., 2001). Some recent improvements of the SGP include: 
extension of the period during which a country should bring its fiscal position 
into balance (5 years) and changes in the way of the budget deficit calculation 
(exclusion of expenditures aimed at achieving the European goals or international 
solidarity). The analyses have shown that the Maastricht criteria and the SGP 
have contributed to macroeconomic stability, convergence of macroeconomic 
indicators and harmonization of growth dynamics across the EU. However, price 
stability is achieved at the cost of economic slowdown (Soukiazis/Castro, 2003). 
Much criticism has been directed towards the theoretical and economic 
policy framework of the nominal criteria for monetary integration in the EU and 
in particular the SGP. The general one refers to the underlying monetarist 
approach according to which inflation is seen as a pure monetary phenomenon 
and low inflation as a prime economic policy objective. Although being an 
integral part of every economic stability programme, price stability could be seen 
as a second range priority in terms of the optimum policy mix and compared to 
sustainable economic growth or increasing employment. If the problem is viewed 
in this way, fiscal policy could, alternatively gain a more active role in promoting 
economic growth through creation of new production capacities, while at the 
same time contributing significantly to price stability through its influence on 
aggregate demand9 (Arestis et al., 2001; Soukiazis/Castro, 2003). Further 
criticism refers to the unbalanced policy mix based on centralized monetary and 
de-centralized fiscal policy (Feldstein, 2005; Chari/Kehoe, 2004; Cooper/Kempf, 
2000). The main argument in this respect it non-existence of the automatic 
mechanism which would limit the uncontrolled increase in public spending under 
conditions of wage rigidity, low mobility of labour force, highly regulated fiscal 
policy and the lack of national monetary and exchange rate policy. However, 
strong emphasises in the EU on price stability and the central bank credibility 
should prevent uncontrolled growth in public spending. On the other hand, the 
SGP is intended to provide fiscal prudence and prevent free-rider behaviour of 
national governments resulting possibly in strong pressure on monetary authority.  
 
                                                 
8 On the role of inter-regional fiscal transfers in coping with asymmetric real shocks in the historical 
process of the US-monetary integration see: Rockoff, 2000. 
9 Another advantage of a more flexible fiscal policy would be achieving optimum effects over a longer 
period. The actual year-based limit for budget deficit is considered inappropriate regarding business 
cycles and the expected endogeneity effects of monetary integration (Feldstein, 2005). 
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2. CROATIAN CONVERGENCE TO THE EMU – THE 
MAASTRICHT CRITERIA 
2.1. Price stability 
In comparison with other countries of Central and East Europe (CEE), 
Croatia realized remarkable price stability throughout the 90s10. This general 
trend was not threatened even in 1998 when prices registered the strongest growth 
of 5,7% (consumer prices) and 10,7% (industrial producer prices), as they soon 
began to stabilise. However, despite that Croatia met the first criterion of 
Maastricht only in the period 2002-2004, while in the coming years Croatian 
inflation rate went beyond the reference value and the EU-average (table 1). 
 
Table 1. 
Inflation rate* in Croatia and transition countries (%) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Euro-area 1,6 1,1 1,1 2,1 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 
EU 27 7,3 4,6 3,0 3,5 3,2 2,5 2,1 2,3 2,3 2,3 
EU 25 2,6 2,1 1,6 2,4 2,5 2,1 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,2 
EU 15 1,7 1,3 1,2 1,9 2,2 2,1 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,2 
HR - 5,7 4,0 4,6 3,8 1,7 1,8 2,1 3,3 3,2 
POL 15,0 11,8 7,2 10,1 5,3 1,9 0,7 3,6 2,2 1,3 
CZE 8,0 9,7 1,8 3,9 4,5 1,4 -0,1 2,6 1,6 2,1 
SVK 6,0 6,7 10,4 12,2 7,2 3,5 8,4 7,5 2,8 4,3 
SLO 8,3 7,9 6,1 8,9 8,6 7,5 5,7 3,7 2,5 2,5 
HUN 18,5 14,2 10,0 10,0 9,1 5,2 4,7 6,8 3,5 4,0 
BUL - 18,7 2,6 10,3 7,4 5,8 2,3 6,1 6,0 7,4 
ROM 154,8 59,1 45,8 45,7 34,5 22,5 15,3 11,9 9,1 6,6 
ref. value 2,73 2,20 2,03 2,67 3,03 2,17 2,70 2,17 2,53 2,93 
* Harmonized index of consumer prices for the EU-member states and index of 
consumer prices for Croatia. 
Source: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 25. 07. 2007]; HNB 
– www.hnb.hr [accessed: 25. 07. 2007] 
 
In respect of prices Croatia diverges from the general trend of other 
reform countries which managed to reduce their inflation, while Croatia faces a 
slight increase in the general price level in the last couple of years. In 2006 also 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary have inflation rate above the EU-
reference value; among them Croatia is the best performer with the annual 
inflation rate exceeding the reference value by only 0,3 percentage points11 (p.p.). 
                                                 
10 This is result of a successful antiiflation programme (October 1993) based on the ortodox and the 
heterodox policy measures which eliminated hyperinflation reaching almost 1.500% in 1993 (Anušić 
et al., 1995). 
11 Forecasts for 2007 speak of further price stabilization in Croatia and an expected increase in prices 
of only 2,9% (EBRD, 2006). 
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In the period from July 2006 to June 2007 Croatia realized a little bit 
stronger price increase than the Euro-area. Total price increase during that period 
amounted to 2,83% (Euro-area: 2,02%) indicating that consumer prices in Croatia 
grew on average by 0,51% à month, while that of the Euro-area reached 0,36% 
monthly. Despite a somewhat faster growth of prices in the first half of 2006 (3-
4% on annual basis), inflation generally kept its moderate character. The main 
reasons for a realised price increase are: increase in the world oil prices which 
contributed to raising both import and domestic prices, increasing prices of food 
and beverages as well as those of agricultural goods (strong seasonal component) 
and finally, increase in administered prices (e.g. water supply, utilities). However, 
nominal increase of domestic currency (HRK) towards the euro (EUR) followed 
by just a moderate increase in wages and rising productivity, prevented higher 
inflation. Basic inflation (without administered prices and seasonal prices of 
agricultural goods) realized a decrease from 3% (December 2005) to 2,7% (June 
2006). 
The prospects for price stability in Croatia and the price convergence to 
the EU-level are fairly good. Regarding the development level (measured by 
GDP) Croatia realizes a relatively high price level in comparison to other 
transition countries, which is, however lower than the EU-average. Thanks to that 
and the strong similarity of the price structure with that of the EU12 no significant 
changes in the general price level are expected in the process of Croatia's 
accession to the EU (Nestić, 2004). Figure 1 shows that the above-average 
increase in prices of services significantly contributed to the overall price growth. 
However, the services sector influence on prices is getting weaker what points at 
the possible diminishing impact of the Balassa-Samulson effect (see: Mihaljek, 
2003). However, this does not exhaust the expected influence of the services 
sector on increase in the general price level as some 'price adjustments' are still 
expected in education, culture and recreation and housing. 
                                                 
12 Most of prices in Croatia are determined by market except for those of utilities (water supply, waste 
water management, transport – rail, maritime) and food (bread, milk), (EBRD, 2006). 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
total
total - without energy
goods
goods - without electricity
services
Source: DZS – Statistički ljetopis Republike Hrvatske 2006., 2007 
Figure 1. The composition of the price increase in Croatia (annual chain index) 
 
According the latest estimations, Croatian accession to the EU could 
cause an additional price increase amounting to 1,4%, mainly due to adjustments 
in the structure of service prices and the effects of tax harmonization with the EU. 
The estimated price adjustments of the youngest EU-member states – Bulgaria 
and Romania are greater and amount to 2,9% and 2%, respectively (EIZ, 2007). 
Thanks to the proclaimed commitment of Croatian government to 
entrepreneurship and the business climate development it is not realistic to expect 
increase in taxes or wages beyond the realized productivity growth as potential 
sources of inflation in medium-term. 
 
2.2. Government finance 
Public finance in Croatia registered recently marked improvements and 
after substantial and continuous decline throughout the observed period, 
consolidated general government deficit has reached the Maastricht level in 2006 
(table 2). Accordingly, balanced increase in consolidated general government 
revenues (6,9%) and expenditures (6,6%) led to a mild decrease of their shares in 
GDP amounting to 45% and 43,9% in 2005, respectively. At the same time tax 
burden13 is reduced from 27,1% (2003) to 26,4% of GDP in 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Tax revenues make app. 60% of total budget revenues, while the largest position on the expenditure 
side take social contributions and unemployment benefits making together almost 70% of total 
expenditures and 30% of GDP in 2005. 
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Table 2. 
Consolidated general government in Croatia and transition countries (% GDP) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU 15 -2,5 -1,7 -0,8 0,5 -1,1 -2,2 -2,9 -2,7 -2,3 -1,6 
HR - - -7,1 -7,5 -6,8 -4,9 -6,2 -4,8 -4,0 -3,0 
POL -4,6 -4,3 -1,8 -1,5 -3,7 -3,2 -6,3 -5,7 -4,3 -3,9 
CZE -3,8 -5,0 -3,7 -3,7 -5,7 -6,8 -6,6 -2,9 -3,5 -2,9 
SVK -6,7 -4,8 -6,4 -11,8 -6,5 -7,7 -2,7 -2,4 -2,8 -3,4 
SLO - - - -3,8 -4,1 -2,5 -2,8 -2,3 -1,5 -1,4 
HUN -5,9 -8,0 -5,5 -2,9 -3,4 -8,2 -7,2 -6,5 -7,8 -9,2 
BUL - 1,7 0,4 -0,5 1,9 0,1 -0,9 2,2 1,9 3,3 
ROM - -3,2 -4,5 -4,6 -3,3 -2,0 -1,5 -1,5 -1,4 -1,9 
ref. value 
(max.) -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 -3,0 
Source: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 30. 08. 2007]; HNB 
– www.hnb.hr [accessed: 29. 08. 2007]; 
 
Thanks to positive developments in government finance, Croatia 
experienced similar trend also in respect of public debt. Despite an increase of 
52,6% in the period 2001-2006 and the average annual growth rate of 8,8%, 
expansion of public debt has practically come to a halt in 2006 when it registered 
a negligible annual increase of 1,1%. In 2006 it reaches 46,6% of GDP what 
shows that it meets the Maastricht criteria and is on the downward path (table 3). 
 
Table 3.  
General government consolidated gross debt of Croatia and transition countries 
(% GDP) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU 15 71,0 68,9 67,9 64,1 63,1 61,5 63,1 63,3 64,4 63,3 
HR - - - 48,7 49,8 48,8 48,6 48,9 49,2 46,6 
POL 44,0 39,1 40,3 36,8 36,7 39,8 47,1 45,7 47,1 47,8 
CZE 12,2 12,9 13,4 18,2 26,3 28,5 30,1 30,7 30,4 30,4 
SVK 33,1 34,0 47,2 49,9 49,2 43,3 42,4 41,5 34,5 30,7 
SLO - 23,6 24,9 27,4 28,4 29,1 28,6 28,9 28,4 27,8 
HUN 64,2 61,9 61,2 55,4 52,2 54,0 58,0 59,4 61,7 66,0 
BUL 105,1 79,6 79,3 73,6 66,2 54,0 45,9 37,9 29,2 22,8 
ROM 16,5 17,8 24,2 22,7 - 23,8 21,5 18,8 15,8 12,4 
ref. value 
(max.) 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 
Source: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 30. 08. 2007]; HNB 
–www.hnb.hr [accessed: 29. 08. 2007] 
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Similarly, the structure of public debt has gone through considerable 
change as its foreign component decreased from app. 60% (2001) to 40% (2006) 
reducing thus the currency risk and contributing to the domestic financial market 
development (figure 2). Thanks to the government strategy the share of public 
debt with fixed interest rate has increased by app. 12 p.p. in the period 2002-2006 
(onto 65%); more than a half of public debt is denominated in EUR (54%), while 















Source: Ministarstvo financija RH – Godišnje izvješće Ministarstva financija za 
2005. godinu, 2006; Ministarstvo financija RH – Godišnje izvješće i strategija 
upravljanja javnim dugom, 2006 
Figure 2. Structure of Croatian general government debt including the non-debt 
positions of the government guarantees (mill. HRK) 
 
Regarding the expected effects of Croatian accession to the EU14, as well 
as the close tightness of Croatian monetary and foreign exchange policy in 
preserving price stability, strong euroization of domestic economy and 
structurally caused external deficit, the realistic medium-term objective of 
Croatian government is to reduce negative public balance well below -3% of 
GDP (planned: -2,7% in 2007 and -0,5% in 2010). This should be achieved 
through structural and fiscal adjustments in public finance (management) 
followed by decrease in general government expenditures from 48% (2006) to 
45,1% of GDP which is foreseen for 2009. Similarly, public debt is planned to 
reach 43,8% of GDP in 2009. 
 
                                                 
14 Estimated net-effects on Croatian budget are negative and amount to app. 1,1% of GDP (Cuculić et 
al., 2004; EIZ, 2007). 
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2.3. Exchange rate 
Unlike the new member countries of the EU Croatia still does not fulfil 
the exchange rate criteria. As a non-member it takes no part in the ERM II which 
determines the main framework of convergence – exchange rate fluctuations 
within standard (±6%) or narrow (±2,25%) margins without pressure on exchange 
rate stability which also includes regular central bank interventions. Despite that, 
Croatia achieved a remarkable stability of its currency against EUR throughout 
the 90s and afterwards; it has a managed floating with the central bank 
interventions aimed at preserving long-term exchange rate and price stability. 
Among the new member countries half of them, though without the opt-out 
clause (like Denmark or the United Kingdom), still has not entered the ERM II 
(table 4). 
Table 4. 
Fulfilment of the exchange rate criteria for Croatia and transition countries, 2007 
 exchange rate mechanism 
entry into 
ERM II 










(10. 08. 2007) 
BUL currency board based to EUR not announced not announced - 1,9558 
CZE managed float to EUR not announced January 2010 - 28,044 
EST currency board in ERM II June 2004 January 2011 15,6466 15,6466 
CYP ERM II May 2005 January 2008 0,585274 0,5842 
LAT fixed peg in ERM II May 2005 not announced 0,702804 0,6982 
LIT currency board in ERM II June 2004 January 2010 3,4528 3,4528 
HUN fixed with band to EUR not announced January 2009 - 253,15 
MAL ERM II May 2005 January 2008 0,4293 0,4293 
POL free float not announced not announced - 3,7787 
ROM managed float to EUR not announced January 2014 - 3,2133 
SVK managed float in ERM II 
November 
2005 January 2009 38,455 33,53 
SLO euro-area managed float June 2004 January 2007 239,64 - 
HR managed float to EUR not announced not announced - 7,3057 
Source: Commission of the European Communities – COM(2006) 671 final, 2006; 
EBRD - Transition Report, 2006; ECB - www.ecb.eu [accessed: 24. 08. 2007] 
 
However, without participation in the ERM II Croatia realized the 
greatest stability of national currency vis-à-vis EUR (table 5). The average 
exchange rate has fluctuated within 10%-band in the period 1997-2005, while the 
fluctuation band for the exchange rate in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
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amounted to 16,4%. The maximum downward deviation of the annual exchange 
rate from the average value was 6,3% (1997) and the maximum upward pressure 
did not exceed app. 3,5% (2000). HRK has generally declined against EUR 
during the 90s, although it registered an appreciation vis-à-vis EUR in the period 
1999-2002. 
Table 5.  
Nominal exchange rates of EUR in Croatia and transition countries 




average 6,96 7,14 7,58 7,64 7,47 7,41 7,56 7,50 7,40 9,7 HR 
PPP* 3,88 4,11 4,17 4,23 4,24 4,35 4,47 4,52 4,51 16,4 
average 3,71 3,92 4,23 4,01 3,67 3,86 4,40 4,53 4,03 23,6 POL PPP 1,77 1,93 2,00 2,07 2,12 2,12 2,16 2,18 2,20 24,3 
average 35,80 36,16 36,88 35,61 34,08 30,81 31,84 31,90 29,78 23,8 CZE PPP 14,89 16,27 16,29 16,34 16,76 16,58 16,99 17,03 16,77 14,4 
average 38,01 39,60 44,12 42,59 43,31 42,70 41,49 40,05 38,59 16,1 SVK PPP 16,67 17,24 17,87 18,26 18,70 18,80 19,96 20,97 21,17 27,0 
average 180,40 186,27 193,63 205,03 217,19 226,22 233,70 238,86 239,64 32,8 SLO PPP 130,88 137,39 142,35 147,57 156,42 167,32 176,31 174,64 175,05 34,7 
average 210,93 240,98 252,80 260,04 256,68 242,97 253,51 251,68 248,05 23,3 HUN 
PPP 97,73 108,15 114,24 122,11 126,48 133,14 142,85 148,28 151,57 55,1 
average 1,90 1,97 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 3,2 BUL PPP 0,48 0,59 0,59 0,61 0,64 0,68 0,68 0,71 0,72 49,7 
average 0,81 1,00 1,63 2,00 2,60 3,13 3,76 4,05 3,62 401,0 ROM PPP 0,23 0,35 0,51 0,72 0,96 1,15 1,40 1,56 1,63 597,0 
* Purchasing power parity. 
Source: WIIW - Handbook of Statistics 2006, 2007 (according to: EUROSTAT); 
EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 24. 08. 2007]; HNB – 
www.hnb.hr [accessed: 25. 08. 2007] 
 
A mild increase in the value of HRK can be observed from 2003 
throughout the first quarter of 2007. Despite steady negative trade deficit the 
reasons for that can be found in growing credit activities of Croatian banks, 
increased foreign investment, increasing demand for government bonds issued in 
HRK, transactions on capital markets (large acquisition in pharmaceutical 
industry in 2006) and expectations of further increase in the value of HRK due to 
opening up of accession negotiations with the EU. However, HRK registered 
significant effective increase (against the currency basket consisting of EUR, 
USD, GBP, CHF and SIT) from 1999 to 2004 to the amount of app. 8,5 p.p. 
Analysis of daily exchange rate reveals significant stability of HRK 
against EUR. The widest actual fluctuation band of daily exchange rates around 
the annual nominal exchange rate was realized in 1998 and 2001 (6-8,5%), while 
it dropped to 3-5% as of 2002 (table 6). Except for some years (1999, 2001) there 
are generally no significant differences between upper and lower fluctuation 
margins indicating the lack of any 'unbalanced' pressure on either devaluation or 
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too strong increase in the value of HRK. This is result of the central bank's 
efficient policy of currency stability (indirectly also price stability due to strong 
euroisation of the economy and inflationary expectations based on EUR) realised 
mostly through foreign exchange auctions. 
Table 6. 
Indicators of the EUR-exchange rate fluctuations in Croatia 








rates from the 
average annual 
exchange rate) 
band downward pressure 
upward 
pressure 
1997 6,960 0,036 2,99 1,34 1,63 
1998 7,138 0,138 6,46 3,09 3,26 
1999 7,580 0,086 4,99 3,70 1,24 
2000 7,635 0,078 3,10 1,71 1,37 
2001 7,469 0,162 8,47 5,00 3,30 
2002 7,407 0,060 3,69 1,33 2,34 
2003 7,563 0,065 3,59 1,63 1,93 
2004 7,495 0,109 5,19 2,16 2,97 
2005 7,400 0,080 5,09 1,50 3,53 
2006 7,323 0,051 2,68 1,16 1,49 
2007* 7,366 0,018 1,13 0,49 0,64 
* 01. 01. – 11. 04. 2007. 
Source: HNB – www.hnb.hr [accessed: 25. 08. 2007] 
 
In order to preserve exchange rate stability Croatian central bank has 
intervened on the euro-market. Usually it purchased the excessive amount of 
EUR resisting in that way a too strong depreciation of EUR. In doing so it used 
sufficiently large international reserves (both in terms of three-month imports an 
the net-amount of the exchange rate auction) which amount to almost 9,2 bill. 
EUR in the mid-2007 (table 7). 
Table 7.  



















EUR of HNB 
1997 2.303,7 0,9 - - - 
1998 2.400,2 1,0 - - - 
1999 3.012,7 1,3 - - - 
2000 3.783,2 1,4 7 240,60 15,7 
2001 5.333,6 1,8 21 503,85 10,6 
Nastavak tablice na sljedećoj stranici 
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2002 5.651,3 1,6 16 220,45 25,6 
2003 6.554,1 1,7 9 -353,80 -18,5 
2004 6.436,2 1,6 11 370,20 17,4 
2005 7.438,4 1,7 9 570,80 13,0 
2006 8.725,3 1,8 14 1.172,03 7,4 
2007 9.170,4** 0,9 2 139,90*** 65,5*** 
* Negative sign indicates net-sale. ** June 2007. *** Until 24. 08. 2007. 
Source: HNB – Godišnje izvješće 2005., 2006; HNB – www.hnb.hr; WIIW – 
Handbook of Statistics 2006, 2007 
 
2.4. Long-term interest rates 
Interest rates on long-term government bonds of transition countries 
have fluctuated in the period under observation, though with stronger mutual 
convergence towards the year 2004. Therefore, already in 2005 interest rates in 
the majority of the new EU members and Croatia registered levels below the 
reference value15 of 5,4% except in Hungary and Poland (table 8). 
 
Table 8.  
Long-term* government bond yields (%), annual average 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20062007** 
EU 25 - - - - - - 4,34 4,44 3,70 - - 
EU 15 6,26 4,93 4,73 5,43 5,00 4,92 4,23 4,27 3,59 4,05 4,69 
Euro-area 5,99 4,71 4,66 5,44 5,03 4,91 4,14 4,12 3,42 3,83 4,31 
HR - - - - - - 6,03 6,15 5,03 4,05 3,88 
POL - - - - 10,68 7,36 5,78 6,90 5,22 5,23 5,22 
CZE - - - 6,72 6,31 4,88 4,12 4,75 3,51 3,78 4,00 
SVK - - - 8,34 8,04 6,94 4,99 5,03 3,52 4,41 4,35 
SLO - - - - - - 6,40 4,68 3,81 3,85 4,43 
HUN - - - - 7,95 7,09 6,82 8,19 6,60 7,12 6,77 
BUL - 10,10 10,05 7,38 6,70 8,26 6,42 5,25 3,80 4,01 - 
ref. value 7,88 6,64 6,69 7,32 6,92 6,89 6,23 6,28 5,40 6,04 - 
* All countries except Croatia: 10 years maturity. Croatia: five years maturity of the HRK-
government bonds. **Euro-area: January-July, Croatia: January-March, Poland: January-
May, other countries: January-June. 
Source: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 04. 08. 2007]; HNB – 
www.hnb.hr [accessed: 05. 08. 2007]; IMF – International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
2006; ECB – www.ecb.eu [accessed: 02. 08. 2007] 
                                                 
15 It is calculated as a simple average of the government bond interest rates of at least 10 years 
maturity of three member countries with the lowest inflation. However, in case of more countries with 
the same inflation rate, more than three average interest rates are taken into calculation. 
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Interest rates on five-year government bonds in Croatia are lower than 
the EU-reference value throughout the period for which the relevant data are 
available. Furthermore, interest rates on all individual government bond series 
(issued on domestic and international market16) are well below the reference 
value for the corresponding year (table 9).  
Table 9.  













listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange 
2002 10 EUR 500,00 6,875 
2004 10 EUR 650,00 5,500 
2004 15 EUR 200,00 5,375 
2005 10 EUR 350,00 4,250 
2005 10 HRK 5.500,00 5,250 
issued on international markets 
1996 14 USD 857,80 6,1425 
1996 10 USD 604,43 6,1425 
2001 10 EUR 750,00 6,4000 
2004 10 EUR 500,00 5,5638 
* Depending on the borrowing conditions nominal interest rates are calculated on 
the basis of the USD 6-month LIBOR- and the 12-months EURIBOR-rates as 
well as the long term (10 years) interest rates on German federal bonds ('Federal 
Bunds'). 
Source: HNB – www.hnb.hr [accessed: 05. 08. 2007]; Ministarstvo financija RH 
– Godišnje izvješće Ministarstva financija za 2005. godinu, 2006; ECB – 
www.ecb.eu [accessed: 06. 08. 2007] 
Apart from the convergence of the government bond interest rates it can 
be generally said that structural and institutional reforms in the financial sector 
are still ahead of Croatia in order to achieve genuine financial market integration 
with the EU and sustainable long-term convergence of interest rates. Currently, 
lending rate in Croatia (2007) reach app. 10% and exceed those of other analysed 
transition countries or the Euro-area (4,64% in June 2007). This is, however still 
a favourable outcome of a decreasing trend of Croatian interest rates which 
started in mid-90s17. In February 2007 the average (short- and long-term) interest 
                                                 
16 By mid-2007 there are 11 government bonds, 4 municipal bonds, 1 bond of Hrvatska banka za 
obnovu i razvitak (HBOR) and 15 corporate bonds on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. Out of total (31 
debt securities) app. one quarter has maturity of at least 10 years what includes all government bonds 
and one corporate bond. 
17 In 1994 interest rates in Croatia amounted to app. 23% resulting from structural problems which 
included bad management and high business costs, underdevelopment and segmentation of financial 
markets, as well as inadequate financial instruments and weak legislation (Kraft, 2001).  
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rate is lower by app. 1,2 p.p. compared to 2000. Hence, Croatia realizes the 
biggest difference between lending and deposit interest rates, while at the same 
time interest rate spread in the Euro-area amounts to 3,34 p.p. and that of the 





















Source: IMF –International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2006; IMF –
International Financial Statistics, May 2006 
Figure 3. Interest rate spreads for Croatia, transition countries and the Euro-area 
(p. p.) 
 
In respect of short-term interest rates Croatia realizes more similarities 
with the Euro-area or the EU 15 than in the case of long-term interest rates. 
Positive adjustments of short-term interest rates had begun in 1998 (when they 
amounted to app. 12%) and continued until 2003-2004 when they registered a 
slight increase on 3-5%; in 2006-2007 they have settled around 2-3%. These 
changes can be observed in figure 4 which depicts fluctuations of money market 
interest rate differentials of transition countries vis-à-vis the Euro-area. The 
highest positive differential achieves Hungary, while Croatia, Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic have negative interest rate differential indicating thus lower 
interest rates than those in Euro-zone. 
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Source: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 04. 08. 2007]; IMF – 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2006; IMF – International Financial Statistics, 
May 2006 
Figure 4. Short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the Euro-area for Croatia 
and transition countries (p. p.) 
An important condition for full and sustainable financial market 
integration with the EU is liberalization of financial transactions. Currently, apart 
from domestic currency convertibility for all transactions of the current account, 
Croatia allows long-term capital transactions which include incoming FDI, profit 
repatriation, unlimited inflow of deposits and borrowing from international 
markets (for business and government). Apart from restrictions in property 
acquisition for foreigners and limitations in buying domestic short-term debt 
securities, the majority of limitations still refer to capital outflows and mainly 
concern natural persons18. 
The structure of banking sector in Croatia is mostly characterized by 
dominance of foreign-owned banks (91,2% of assets in 2005) which largely 
contributed to rising competitiveness and efficiency in the sector, leading to fall 
in lending rates and interest rate spreads. Banking in Croatia is characterized by 
four leading banks which own 41% of total assets, while six largest ones achieve 
an assets share of 64% and a market share of app. 80%19 (Ljubaj, 2005). 
Additionally, domestic banks mostly borrow from foreign capital markets 
because of insufficient domestic deposits and their inconvenient maturity 
structure (mainly short-term), as well as more stabile and cheaper capital sources 
on international markets (Galac/Dukić, 2005); this indicates low efficiency of 
                                                 
18 Corporations can open account with the foreign bank only with special permission and the same regulation 
refers to transactions on foreign financial markets. These measures remain due to the fear of an unexpected 
capital outflow or speculative attack on domestic currency.  
19 It is encouraging, however that the four leading banks have reduced their share which in 2000 amounted to 
app. 50% of total bank assets. 
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domestic capital markets in financial intermediation. The consolidation of 
banking sector in Croatia can also be seen through mergers on domestic market 
which resulted in decreasing number of banks (43 in 2000 and 34 in 2005). 
Further, Croatia has a low share of state-owned banks (3,4% of bank assets). In 
comparison with other transition countries Croatia has a high share of non-
performing loans (7,2% of total loans), while together with Slovenia it takes the 
leading position regarding the credit expansion with the total value of loans 
granted to private sector of 55,6% of GDP20 in 2005 (EBRD, 2006). 
Development of Croatian non-banking sector is still unsatisfactory 
despite improved legal regulation21. Annual stock trading volume is still 
relatively low, due to which bonds make the greatest share of financial market 
instruments. Although the stock market capitalization in Croatia registered a 
marked increase in 2006 (50% of GDP in 2006 compared to 13,5% in 2000), 
there are still opportunities for its further growth in the future (table 10). The 
same also refers to bond market capitalization. 
Table 10.  
Financial markets indicators for Croatia and transition countries, 2005 
 HR CZE HUN POL SVK SLO 
daily stock trading volume 
(Mill. EUR) 2,3 92,0 99,8 825,1 0,2 1,6 
daily bond trading volume 
(Mill. EUR) 24,4 65,4 2,3 16,4 60,3 0,5 
annual stock trading 
volume/GDP (%) 2,0 26,9 31,3 106,6 0,1 1,6 
annual bond trading 
volume/GDP (%) 21,7 19,1 0,7 2,1 37,2 0,5 
turnover velocity* 5,3 50,7 91,2 188,9 0,8 6,1 
stock market capitalization 
(Mill. EUR) 10.954 45.745 27.586 110.083 4.067 6.699 
bond market capitalization 
(Mill. EUR) 4.668 22.533 31.300 - 11.138 6.052 
stock market 
capitalization/GDP (%) 38,6 53,1 34,3 56,4 12,3 25,8 
bond market 
capitalization/GDP (%) 16,4 26,1 39,0 - 33,7 23,4 
Eurobond issuance/GDP (%) 0,0 1,1 6,1 4,0 0,0 0,0 
Monthly turnover on annual basis (multiplied by 100) as a stock market capitalization 
ratio. 
Source: HNB – Godišnje izvješće 2005., 2006 (according to: Bloomberg.com); EBRD 
– Transition Report 2006, 2006 
                                                 
20 At the end of 2006 49,2% of bank loans went to households, while 40,4% make corporate loans. The rest 
of loans is granted to government (7,5%), other financial institutions (2,1%), non-residents (0,6%) and non-
profit insitutions (0,3%). Such a loan structure is more similar to advanced market economies and raises the 
issue of its medium-to-long term sustainability. 
21 While banking legislation fully complies with the EU-norms (the highest EBRD-reform index: 4,0), the 
remaining financial sector activities are still insufficiently regulated without the necessary institutions, 
particularly in the field of securities markets (EBRD-reform index: 2,7), (EBRD, 2006). 
 131 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XVI. (2007) BR. 2. (113-146)          Derado, D., Mlikota A.: IS CROATIA… 
3. SUSTAINABILITY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
– CROATIAN REAL CONVERGENCE TO THE EU 
3.1. Trade openness and trade structure 
Apart from nominal criteria the success of monetary integration depends 
also upon real convergence in respect of production factors mobility, degree of 
fiscal solidarity and the achieved level of trade integration. Generally, the 
readiness for monetary integration increases with increasing trade openness. 
In economies strongly linked with international market, international 
prices can substantially influence domestic price structure and make exchange 
rate policy interventions less effective in achieving economic stability 
(McKinnon criterion). This especially refers to SMOPEC which face perfectly 
elastic foreign demand and realize a significant share of tradable goods in 
production and exports. Therefore, SMOPEC are considered to be more inclined 
to monetary integration. If they, further realize strong trade integration with a 
group of countries or regions, then introducing a single currency might be even 
more advantageous due to elimination of exchange rate risk and sometimes even 
inflation expectations (e.g. Croatia). Output and trade structure are relevant 
criteria of real convergence in determining the success of monetary integration. 
Countries with diversified production and export structure which, however 
display a certain degree of cross-country similarities are better candidates for 
monetary integration as asymmetric shocks are less likely to occur among them 
thus eliminating the need for costly stabilization policy (Kennen criterion). Those 
which do not fulfil these criteria can experience negative (uneven) impact of 
external shocks, asynchronous national business cycles and different responses to 
common monetary policy which, taken together, can considerably reduce 
medium- to long-term growth prospects for the entire monetary union and each 
member country (Angeloni et al., 2005). This can be avoided if trade is 
predominantly of intra-industry type since countries which trade more within 
instead of between industries realize not only strong trade integration, but also 
high degree of complementary in trade structures which resemble similarities in 
the level of development and income. 
Croatia achieves a fairly modest trade openness in 2005 (105,8% of 
GDP), since the only two worse positioned countries are Poland and Romania 
whose lower participation in international trade can be explained through their 
large domestic markets (table 11). Croatian trade openness registered constant 
expansion, although with slower pace in the second half of the 90s (1990: 45,2%, 
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Table 11.  
Various indicators of trade integration of Croatia and transition countries, 2005 
















HR 105,8 70,2 15,5 74,7 6,5 14,42 
POL 74,4 83,1 6,5 79,4 4,5 16,16 
CZE 141,2 90,4 13,6 82,6 5,1 12,12 
SVK 158,1 85,8 10,7 76,2 3,7 29,79 
SLO 129,5 92,9 10,7 78,0 6,9 33,41 
HUN 136,9 89,4 24,5 83,6 14,3 30,64 
BUL 137,9 70,6 24,2 68,0 11,0 11,81 
ROM 76,5 81,8 18,4 77,4 5,7 18,42 
* Share of exports and imports of goods and services in GDP. 
** Share of goods of commodity classes 5-8 in 0-9 (SITC).  
*** Krugman dissimilarity index. In the seventh column it is calculated on the 
basis of two pairs of data series: 1. extra-EU imports and Croatian total exports 
and 2. intra-EU imports and intra-EU exports for the analysed transition countries 
(members of the EU 27). 
Source: WIIW – Handbook of Statistics 2006, 2007; EUROSTAT – 
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu [accessed: 11. 09. 2007] 
 
However, rising Croatian trade integration with foreign markets is 
realized mostly through soaring imports which by 2005 exceeded its pre-
transition value by 2,5 times and realized an annual average growth of 13,2% 
(reaching 18,6 bill. USD in 2005). Throughout the 90s exports was flat at the 
level of 3,5-4,5 bill. USD à year and registered more significant growth first in 
2002; during 2000-2005 it realised annual growth of 25,5% on average and 
reached 8,8 bill. USD in 2005. According to these developments negative trade 
balance registered a steady growth and reached in 2005 a cumulative value of 
61,8 bill. USD (equal to app. double Croatian GDP in 2005). Analogously, 
export-import ratio decreased to 47% in 2005 (2000: 56%). 
As regards regional structure of Croatian trade, the greatest part (69,3% 
of exports and 73,8% of imports) is realised with developed countries among 
which the EU takes the prominent place22. Nevertheless, Croatian trade 
                                                 
22 The most important EU-trading partners are Italy, Germany, Slovenia and Austria which together 
make app. three quarters of Croatian total trade. The most important non-EU export markets for 
Croatia are Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (2005), USA ad Libia where app. 25% 
of total exports is realised. 
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integration with the EU is lower than that of the new EU-member states, except 
for Bulgaria. As expected, Croatia trades more with the enlarged EU (app. 60%), 
than with the EU 15 (app. 50%), but contrary to experience of other countries it 
realised a decreasing trade integration with the EU what points at possible trade 
diversion resulting from non-participation in the integration process during the 
90s (table 12). 
Table 12. 







2005 BUL CZE HUN POL SVK SLO ROM 
EU 25 61,3 74,5 69,3 61,9 56,6 84,1 76,4 77,2 85,4 67,9 67,6 exports 
EU 15 59,9 57,6 54,4 48,0 51,6 66,0 65,5 65,0 57,8 59,2 59,4 
EU 25 59,8 78,5 70,1 65,5 49,6 71,0 68,2 65,6 71,1 80,9 62,2 
imports EU 15 54,9 62,1 55,4 50,6 43,9 57,7 58,1 59,6 46,2 71,8 52,0 
* EU 25 does not include Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Source: WIIW – Handbook of Statistics 2006, 2007; WIIW – Handbook of 
Statistics Countries in Transition 2003, 2004 
Regarding the sector structure a dominant share in Croatian trade is 
realized by machinery and transport equipment (class 7 of SITC) and various 




















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
Source: DZS – Statistički ljetopis Republike Hrvatske 2006., 2007; DZS – Statistički 
ljetopis Republike Hrvatske 2005., 2006 
Figure 5. Croatian export (outer circle) and import (inner circle) structure, 
(SITC), 2005 
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Despite the high share of manufactured goods in export and import 
flows, Croatia generally achieves a relatively low share of manufacturing in total 
trade, since manufacturing makes close to or even exceeds 80% of total trade in 
the advanced transition countries (table 11). The similarity analysis23 sheds, 
however a slightly different light on the relative position of Croatian exports and 
imports. According to it, 15,5% of Croatian exports differs in structure (0-9 
SITC) from the average of the analysed transition countries with the greatest gap 
in machinery and transport equipment (class 7) and manufactured goods 
classified by material (class 6) to the amount of 9,14 p.p. and 6,15 p.p., 
respectively. Mineral fuels (class 3) realise an above average share in exports 
(6,65 p.p.). Import flows, however show lower degree of dissimilarity which 
ranges from 3,7% (Slovakia) to 14,3% (Hungary). According to this indicator 
Croatia is similar to Slovenia, yet better positioned than Bulgaria and Hungary. 
The analysis of the similarity of extra-EU (27) imports and Croatian exports on 
the one hand and intra-EU (27) imports and exports for new member countries 
shows, namely that Croatia is better positioned than Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Romania and could presumably better react to external shocks than these 
countries. The dissimilarity of Croatian exports and the EU 27-imports from 
outside the single market amounts to app. 20%, while this difference climbs to 
almost one third of export and import flows in the case of the worst positioned 
countries (table 11). The strongest harmony of trade flows with the EU 27 
achieves Slovenia (just below 90%) closely followed by Slovakia, Poland and the 
Czech Republic. 
 
3.2. Intra-industry trade and similarities in production structure 
Successful countries of CEE have experienced a significant increase in 
IIT during the 90s – while at the beginning of transition the share of IIT ranged 
between 20% (Romania) and 40% (Hungary, ex-Czechoslovakia), it increased by 
10-25 p.p. by the mid 90s and continued to do so, however at a slower pace, 
towards the end of the 90s. Despite the differences in the IIT-dynamics across 
countries it can generally be said that structural adjustments in advanced 
transition countries have contributed to real convergence and increasing trade 
                                                 
23 This analysis is based on the methodology proposed by Krugman (1993) and known as the 
Krugman dissimilarity index which is in this case adjusted to obtain a relative measure (Angeloni et 








riDIST     i, j = 1, 2, ... n. 
In this version, numerator represents the sum of the absolute differences in the shares (S) of the 
analysed variable i and the share of the reference variable r (e.g. average) over a group of activities j. 
The result is given in percentage, while the original Krugman index assumes values within 0-2. In 
both version lower value of index indicates greater similarity between analysed variables (e.g. trade or 
output structure). 
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integration with the developed countries of the EU24. The most successful 
countries of CEE realize nowadays IIT comparable to that of Italy, Denmark, 
Spain and Austria and exceeding that of geographically peripheral countries of 
the EU (Greece, Finland, Ireland, Portugal), (table 13).  
Table 13. 
Intra-industry trade of the EU-countries and countries of South East Europe (%), 
1998 
 FRA GER GBR BEL NDL AUT ESP ITA DEN SWE POR IRL FIN GRE 
IIT 79,5 77,0 75,2 74,6 72,3 68 65,9 61,4 60,8 57,3 50,5 45,7 44,5 26,4 
 CZE SLO HUN SVK POL BUL EST ROM LIT LAT ALB SMT MAC BIH 
IIT 66,0 58,1 57,3 44,7 44,4 34,0 30,0 29,2 26,3 22,6 33,1 31,8 25,5 24,5 
Source: Fidrmuc, 2001;Astrov, 2001 
The forthcoming analysis of Croatian IIT25 is based on the standard 
methodology developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1971, 1975) and takes reference to 
relevant contributions to improvements in case of trade imbalance and statistical 
aggregation (see: Derado, 2007). Taking account of the previous empirical studies 
(e.g. Blanes/Martin, 2000; Behr, 1998; Gabrisch, 1995), in this part Croatian IIT 
with all countries, EU 15 and CEEC 7 (before joining the EU) is analysed. The 
research is carried out on the 3- and 1-digit level of statistical aggregation (SITC), 
as well as on the level of total trade and refers to the most dynamic period of 
transition – the 90s – in which marked changes in trade and output structure have 
occurred. Except complete trade flows (0-9 SITC) special reference is given to 
manufacturing (5-8 SITC).  
As shown in table 14 Croatia has a relatively low level of IIT, i.e. it still 
keeps having prevailing specialization between instead of within industries what 
further reduces prospects for closer trade integration as an important prerequisite 
for successful participation in a monetary union. Although Croatia, having 
reached 44% of IIT, compares well with Poland and Slovakia and is even better 
than all the countries of South East Europe (including Bulgaria and Romania), it 
actually goes through a decrease in the share of similar trade flows, particularly 





                                                 
24 However, apart from successful trade integration and efficient re-orientation of the transition 
countries' trade towards the EU (Hoekman/Djankov, 1997), some authors point out slow convergence 
of their output structures to the EU-specialization pattern (Angeloni et al., 2005). 
25 Based on data series for exports and imports in 1990, 1995 and 2001 obtained from the Central 
Statistical Buerau of the Republic of Croatia (Državni zavod za statistiku). 
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Table 14. 
 Croatian intra-industry trade: all countries and selected country groups (%) 
 all countries EU 15 CEEC 7* ex-YU** 
0-9 SITC 38,4 38,2 17,5 - 1990 5-8 SITC 45,3 40,4 25,3 - 
0-9 SITC 46,3 38,6 41,7 53,2 1995 5-8 SITC 53,4 45,1 46,5 60,2 
0-9 SITC 44,1 39,6 36,0 47,3 2001 5-8 SITC 46,6 40,0 34,4 55,7 
* Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
** Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia. 
Source: author, according to: DZS – export and import data series for 1990, 
1995, 2001 
 
Mostly due to the modest business and trade integration with the 
developed countries before the 90s and similarly to other transition countries, 
Croatia experienced a significant increase in IIT in the first years of transition 
reforms. However, unlike more successful countries which continued to 
experience a growing IIT afterwards, Croatia realized a fall in 'trade overlap' with 
all analysed country groups and CEEC 7 in particular. This can be explained 
through more successful re-orientation of the advanced transition countries' trade 
towards more competitive EU-markets, induced by economic integration (trade 
liberalization) and dynamic economic restructuring. Regarding the unfavourable 
conditions in trade with CEEC 7, as well as the steady state of Croatian IIT with 
the EU prior to the last two enlargements (2004, 2007) it can be further assumed 
that in the following years Croatia has reduced the share of IIT with EU 27. The 
assumed trade diversion in this case strengthens the dominant specialization 
pattern according to factor proportions thus reducing capacities for monetary 
integration in the future, even from the point of view of the endogeneity 
approach. 
A more detailed analysis across main classes of trading goods reveals 
similar level in IIT between the EU and total trade. However, Croatia achieves 
lower IIT with the EU in each class of commodities except for mineral fuels 
(class 3) and other commodities (class 9) which together make less than 15% of 
Croatian trade volume in 2005, (table 15). Furthermore, in trade with food and 
live animals (class 0), raw materials (class 2) and animal and vegetable oils and 
fats (class 4) there can be observed further deterioration of the gap between the 
EU and all countries. However, there is no large difference in IIT between trade 
with the EU and other countries in manufactured goods (5-8 SITC), except for 
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Table 15. 
Croatian intra-industry trade, with all countries and the EU (%, p.p.), 1990-2001 
SITC 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1990 42,10 52,36 21,93 13,37 22,44 45,24 49,32 39,48 51,70 83,42 
1995 48,35 60,40 39,32 13,14 52,69 46,99 60,53 41,09 66,95 1,06 
all 
countries 
(%) 2001 52,91 43,29 45,60 22,55 55,83 47,40 48,82 37,29 63,39 40,70 
1990 36,38 33,79 24,43 29,08 6,79 26,98 48,71 31,58 54,61 82,29 
1995 30,31 50,28 23,06 9,82 10,24 25,88 50,99 32,49 63,74 0,67 EU 15 (%) 
2001 27,48 32,93 21,94 63,52 18,03 28,45 43,56 33,83 54,62 78,63 
1990 -5,70 -18,60 2,50 15,70 -15,70 -18,30 -0,60 -7,90 2,90 -1,10 
1995 -18,00 -10,10 -16,30 -3,30 -42,50 -21,10 -9,50 -8,60 -3,20 -0,40 difference (p.p.) 
2001 -25,40 -10,40 -23,70 41,00 -37,80 -19,00 -5,30 -3,50 -8,80 37,90 
Source: author, according to: DZS – export and import data series for 1990, 
1995, 2001 
 
Generally, analysis of IIT across industries (3-digit SITC) points at 
decreasing 'trade overlap' in goods of higher level of finalization as well as of 
more complex products, while the realised level of IIT is still stabile in goods 
such as machinery and transport equipment and those of metal industry which are 
produced mainly on the basis of standard technology. A relatively high level of 
IIT in low knowledge-intensive products reveals weaker possibilities for business 
cooperation between domestic and foreign producers, i.e. weaker basis for further 
trade integration. Weak industrial structure of IIT where sometimes just a few 
products of the whole industry are traded on intra-industry basis proves an ad hoc 
character of trade and an accidental specialization pattern. That points at 
undefined technological and industrial structure of Croatian industry and trade 
without which it is hard to find a niche and stabile position on international 
market, including also making advantage of economic integration. 
Production structure and structure of the gross value added, based on the 
calculation of the Krugman dissimilarity index, are depicted in figure 6. The 
slightest difference in the output structure in comparison to the EU is achieved by 
Poland (13,8%), the Czech Republic (15,6%) and Slovenia (16,1%) which 
compare well to Austria and Italy and are even better ranked than Scandinavian 
and Baltic countries. Bulgaria and Romania display pronounced dissimilarity in 
output structure amounting to 25% and 33%, respectively. The structure of gross 
value added (across industries) shows, however somewhat different results 
according to which Poland and Slovenia take the bottom positions with the index 
values ranging between 25% and 30%. Croatia belongs to the same group of 
transition countries with the dissimilarity index of 29% taking in that way the 
back seat position also when compared to all EU-member countries; the only ones 
with higher dissimilarity in the structure of gross value added in comparison to 
the EU-average are Luxembourg (37,5%), Cyprus (39%), Lithuania (40,1%), 
Latvia (40,2%) and Ireland (44,4%).  
 
 138 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XVI. (2007) BR. 2. (113-146)          Derado, D., Mlikota A.: IS CROATIA… 
Figure 6. 
Krugman dissimilarity index of transition countries with the EU* (NACE, DA-













* EU 26 due to the non-availability of the statistical data for Malta. 
Source: author, according to: EUROSTAT – epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
[accessed: 12. 09. 2007] 
When both criteria of structure similarity (output and gross value added) 
are taken together, it becomes obvious that only the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and, to a slightly lesser extent, Hungary realise the highest production similarity 
in to the structure of the EU as a whole what makes them prospective candidates 




By giving up monetary sovereignty, joining a monetary union is a 
challenging process the main benefits of which are elimination of the exchange 
rate risk, price stability and reduction in transaction costs, capital market 
development and sometimes even improvements in the monetary policy 
credibility. These advantages prove to be especially important in case of small 
open economies which are usually highly integrated into international market and 
are unable to influence their real competitiveness through prices, nor through 
adjustments in the nominal exchange rate. However, monetary integration denies 
the opportunity to react to external shocks through exchange rate policy and calls 
for new economic policy measures in achieving macroeconomic stability. 
As far as Croatian readiness for the monetary integration with the EU is 
concerned, it fulfils the most of the Maastricht criteria and achieves stabile prices 
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with positive long-term outlook (even with the expected adjustments in the price 
structure upon EU-accession) and stabile exchange rate, though not formally 
within the ERM II. Long-term interest rates are strongly converging to the EU-
level and government deficit just reaches the reference value. The last will 
probably need the greatest efforts in order to be reduced to the level sustainable 
even after accession to the EU. In respect of real convergence, Croatia proves to 
be less successful compared to most of the new EU-member states. A relatively 
low trade openness and shrinking trade integration with the EU, followed by low 
share in IIT and prevailing specialisation according to factor proportions, make 
Croatian trade structure less similar to that of the EU. This is followed by low 
similarity in the production structure and the composition of gross value added. 
Regarding the above said, and at least five to six years before joining the ERM II 
at earliest, Croatia should strongly concentrate on improving structural reforms 
and adjusting economic policy measures in order to increase real convergence to 
the EU and achieve a more dynamic economic growth. Apart from structural 
reforms these should include a variety of horizontal measures aimed at improving 
international competitiveness through increasing value added in manufacturing, 
transfer of technology, business network creation with the EU-producers, 
increasing knowledge intensity in the production and improving business and 
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JE LI HRVATSKA SPREMNA ZA EMU?: EX ANTE 
ANALIZA NOMINALNOG I REALNOG PRIBLIŽAVANJA 
 
Sažetak 
Proširenje EU i uspješni proces ekonomske integracije ukazali su na monetarnu 
integraciju i uvjete za njeno uspješnije djelovanje. Glavni teorijski okvir analize – 
OVP(Optimalno Valutno Područje) -teorija – predviđa tri važna uvjeta za to – 
mobilnost proizvodnih faktora, fiskalna solidarnost i trgovinska integracija. Iako 
nije teorijski utemeljeno, Maastricht kriterij cijene i stabilnost deviznog tečaja, 
uravnoteženo javno financiranje te dugoročne kamatne stope trebale bi 
doprinijeti uspješnoj monetarnoj integraciji u EU koja se suočava s među 
regionalnim razlikama na razini razvoja i vjerojatnosti vanjskih udara. Analiza 
nominalnog približavanja pokazuje da se Hrvatska približava referentnim 
vrijednostima EU i da postiže visoki stupanj makroekonomske stabilnosti. Ipak 
zaostaje za uspješnim novim zemljama-članicama EU u pogledu trgovinske 
integracije i sličnosti proizvodne strukture, koje su veoma važni pokazatelji 
dugoročnih prednosti monetarne integracije.  
Ključne riječi: optimalno valutno područje, devizni tečaj, trgovinska 
integracija, EMU, Hrvatska 
JEL klasifikacija: F36 
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